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ARTICLES
INSURANCE COVERAGE CONCERNS IN
CALIFORNIA CONTINUOUS PROPERTY LOSS
CASES AFTER PRUDENTIAL-LMI
Michael J. Brady,* Robert P. Andris**
and Richard Fisher***
I. INTRODUCTION
Presently, one of the more unsettled areas in the law of
insurance coverage in California is that of continuous loss. The
term "continuous loss" refers to damage which occurs over an
extended period of time and, therefore, often during the ef-
fective periods of several successive insurance policies. Al-
though this phenomenon typically involves damage caused by a
force of nature, such as soil subsidence or dry rot, it can also
be man-made; e.g., by industrial pollutants slowly leaching
through the insureds' land into adjoining land or the water table.'
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Ropers, Majeski, Kohn, Bentley, Wagner & Kane and is currently serving as Presi-
dent of the Northern California Association of Defense Counsel. A graduate of
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1. Some courts and commentators have used the phrase "continuous loss"
when dealing with bodily injury claims such as asbestosis or silicosis. Whether or
not the phrase is properly applied to bodily injury cases, this article is limited to
an examination of those California cases dealing with continuous propety losses.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
In a typical continuous loss case, discovery reveals that the
damage itself' "started" many years before it was "discovered"
by the insured or the claimant. If the property was covered by
several successive insurance policies, the question often arises
as to which, if any, of those successive policies is at risk for the
claim. If several insurance companies are involved, each carrier
will point to the other, claiming that its policy is not liable for
the loss, and the insured or the claimant will typically make
every effort to keep as many of the insurers in the case as
possible in order to promote settlement.
The purpose of this article is to discuss the evolution of
California insurance coverage cases involving continuous losses
for both first- and third-party property damage claims. In the
first-party context, the California Supreme Court's recent
Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v. Superior Court' decision
settled the majority of the questions which had arisen. Because
policy considerations for the first- and third-party claims over-
lap but are not identical, it is the authors' opinion that the
rules of Prudential-LMI may not be directly applied to
third-party cases.
The evolution of continuing loss theories in California has
not followed an orderly progression. Nevertheless, after dis-
cussing general policy considerations involved in both first-
and third-party cases (e.g., the loss-in-progress rule), this article
will discuss the more recent and significant court of appeal
decisions in the order in which they were published. The next
section of this article provides a detailed discussion of the
California Supreme Court's recent Prudential-LMI Commercial
Insurance v. Superior Court' decision and its impact on both
first- and third-party coverage cases. Finally, this article will
discuss how the court may rule in a continuous loss case aris-
ing from a third-party property damage claim.
II. THE LOSS-IN-PROGRESS RULE
One consideration underlying all of the cases addressing
the issue of continuous loss is the impact of the
2. E.g., foundation damage caused by soil subsidence.
3. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 798 P.2d 1230, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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"loss-in-progress" rule. This rule provides that where a form of
damage or loss is already in progress or is "certain," a carrier
insuring the premises thereafter is not liable for the loss. The
rule applies even if the loss is caused by an occurrence which
would have been covered under the subsequent policy, had it
occurred within that policy period.
The rationale for the loss-in-progress rule is that insurance
carriers are only expected to provide insurance for contingent
or unexpected events. As a matter of public policy, one should
not be able to incur a loss and then purchase insurance to
cover that loss. Otherwise, one could wait until he or she had
an accident before purchasing insurance.
California Insurance Code section 22 provides: "Insurance
is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another
against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent or
unknown event."6 California Insurance Code section 250 fur-
ther provides: "Except as provided in this article, any contin-
gent or unknown event, whether past or future, which may
damnify a person having an insurable interest, or create a lia-
bility against him, may be insured against, subject to the provi-
sions of this code."7 Thus, if the loss actually began prior to
the specific policy period in question, and if that loss is no
longer contingent or unknown, the loss cannot be covered
under a policy of insurance which becomes effective at a subse-
quent date.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF CONTINUOUS Loss THEORIES:
FIRST- AND THIRD-PARTY CASES
A. The Snapp and Sabella Decisions
The first case to discuss continuous property losses in the
first-party context was Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.8
Snapp involved coverage for damage to a residence built on a
landfill. Because of the instability of the fill, exacerbated by
subsequent rains, a landslide occurred damaging the founda-
tion of the house. The loss "materialized" and became "ascer-
6. CAL. INS. CODE § 22 (West 1972).
7. CAL. INS. CODE § 250 (West 1972).
8. 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1962).
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tainable" during State Farm's policy period and continued af-
ter the policy term had expired.'
State Farm first argued that because the initial instability
of the fill made the resulting earth movement "inevitable," the
loss was not a "fortuitous event" and, therefore, was not cov-
ered pursuant to the loss-in-progress rule. ° The court dis-
agreed, holding that even if the loss was "inevitable," that did
not alter the fact that, at the time the insurance contract was en-
tered into, the loss was still a contingency or a risk that might
not occur within the effective dates of the policy in ques-
tion."
State Farm next asserted that even assuming it was respon-
sible for the loss, its duty became "terminable" on the date its
policy expired. The court again disagreed, holding:
Once the contingent event insured against has occurred
during the period covered, the liability of the carrier be-
comes contractual rather than potential only, and the sole
issue remaining is the extent of its obligation, and it is
immaterial that this may not be fully ascertained at the
end of the policy period."
The court concluded that the date of "materialization" of
a loss determines which carrier must provide indemnity for a
loss suffered by the insured, and the carrier insuring the risk
at the time the damage is first "discovered" is liable for the
entire loss.' s
In Sabella v. Wisler,"4 the California Supreme Court af-
firmed the Snapp rule in another case involving losses caused
by uncompacted fill and defective workmanship in the con-
struction of the insureds' residence. The Sabella court simply
held that the loss was covered because it was a contingency at
the time the parties entered into the policy. 5
In sum, the Sabella and Snapp decisions held that in the
first-party context, the insurer on the risk when the damage
"materialized" must indemnify the insured for his entire loss,
9. Id. at 831, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
10. Id. at 830, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
11. Id., 24 Cal. Rptr. at 45-46.
12. Id. at 832, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 831-32, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
14. 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
15. Id. at 34, 377 P.2d at 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
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even if property damage takes place in prior or subsequent
policy periods.
B. California Union
The first California case to discuss coverage for continu-
ous property losses in the third-party context was California
Union Insurance Co. v. Landmark Insurance Co. 6 This decision
spawned more controversies than it settled.
California Union involved a gradual leak of water from a
swimming pool which caused damage to adjoining property.
The parties stipulated that the pool began to leak in June of
1979, and that the pool crack was the sole cause of the proper-
ty damage. 7 Damage to the adjoining property was caused
between July 1979 and November 1980.18 Landmark provided
insurance from July 1978 to July 1980. Cal Union provided
insurance from July 1980 to July 198 1.1"
The source of the damage was actually discovered follow-
ing an inspection of the pool in October of 1980 during the
Cal Union policy period. At trial, the two insurance companies
contested liability for the damage which occurred between Oc-
tober 1980 and November 1980. Landmark had undertaken
repairs prior to July of 1980, and apparently repaired the dam-
age to the slopes of the adjoining property, but did not repair
the source of the damage, the pool. Landmark contended that
this damage constituted a separate "occurrence" within the
terms of the Cal Union policy and, thus, was Cal Union's re-
sponsibility.2" Cal Union argued that the damage was a con-
tinuation of the "occurrence" which began during the period
of coverage provided by the Landmark policies and, thus, was
the responsibility of Landmark.2'
The trial court held that each manifestation of damage
should be treated as a separate "occurrence" under the poli-
cies, thereby rejecting Cal Union's argument that incidents of
manifestation which are attributable to the same underlying
cause are merely manifestations of the same continuous occur-
16. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
17. Id. at 468, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
18. Id. at 467, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 463.
19. Id. at 467-69, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 463-64.
20. Id. at 468, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 464.
21. Id.
855
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
rence." The Court of Appeal, however, pointed out that this
ruling "seems to fly in the face of ... language in both poli-
cies. " "
On appeal, both parties relied on Remmer v. Glens Falls
Indemnity Co.24 for the proposition that the occurrence of an
accident is the time when the complaining party is actually
damaged, rather than the time when the wrongful act was com-
mitted.25 A distinction is that a claimant is not deemed to be
"damaged," for purposes of first-party coverage until the loss is
discovered. Thus, while the damaging event may have occurred
and the damage may be manifest, the Remmer court held that
until the insured discovers the loss, the insured is not deemed
to be damaged under the policy.
26
The California Union court found Remmer v. Glens Falls
inapposite. The court stated that the case involved a "continu-
ous active force at work between the parameters of those
[policies' effective] dates."" Therefore, the court held, the
damage fell within the coverage provisions of both policies-the
policy on the risk when the damage was first discovered and
the policy in effect when further damage was sustained and its
cause was discovered.
The Calfornia Union court stated that there was ample
authority for the proposition that the first carrier's responsibil-
ity may continue even after the term of the policy has ex-
pired.2" For example, Snapp involved a standard-form fire in-
surance policy, which included coverage for earth move-
ment.29 The earth movement began during the policy period
and continued after expiration of the policy period. The Cali-
22. Id. at 469, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
23. Id.
24. 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d 19 (1956).
25. California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462,
470-71, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 465 (1983).
26. Remmer v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d at 88, 295 P.2d
at 22. This analysis may not necessarily be applied in the third-party context. In a
third-party case, the insured (for example, a contractor) does not suffer an actual
loss, or receive notice of the defect, until a claim is filed against the insured. This
policy consideration is discussed in greater detail in the penultimate section of
this article. See infr notes 100-22 and accompanying text.
27. California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 473, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 467.
28. Id. at 474, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
29. Id. at 475, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 468.
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fornia Union court allowed coverage to continue after the poli-
cy had expired stating that:
[I]n a one occurrence case involving continuous, progres-
sive and deteriorating damage, the carrier in whose policy
period the damage first becomes apparent remains on the
risk until the damage is finally and totally complete, not-
withstanding a policy provision which purports to limit the
coverage solely to those accidents/occurrences within the
time parameters of the stated policy term. 30
Having reached the conclusion that Landmark could not
escape responsibility for the pool leakage, the court felt it
would be "unjust" to allow Cal Union to escape liability. The
court pointed out that "[w]hile it is true that the force produc-
ing the damage was already in motion when Cal Union came
on the risk, that damage-causing force continued and further
substantial corrective procedures were necessary."3
The court cited the Gruol Construction Co. v. Insurance Co.
of North America32 decision with approval. Gruol involved a
claim for continuous loss due to dry rot which occurred over
several successive policy periods. The court held that the dam-
age, while continuing for several years, constituted but a single
injury. Nevertheless, the court also held all of the carriers on
the risk and that the burden of apportionment of the damage
was on the carriers.
3 3
The California Union court also discussed two products
liability cases, Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insu-
lations4 and Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America. 5
These cases held that an insurer, once liable for a continuous
loss under a policy, will not be able to escape liability for fu-
ture losses from the same occurrence by a mere refusal to
renew the policy.36 The insurer is responsible for all damage
to the insured property caused by a covered peril which occurs
within the policy period.
30. Id. at 476, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
31. California Union, 145 Cal. App. 3d at 476, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
32. 11 Wash. App. 632, 524 P.2d 427 (1974).
33. California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462,
477, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461, 470 (1983).
34. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
35. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cet denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
36. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1222-23; Keene Cotp., 667 F.2d at
1044-45.
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The California Union court may have failed to recognize
the importance of the precedent it was setting. No prior con-
tinuous property loss case in California had held that damage
caused by the insured could be manifest, yet the insured could,
thereafter, obtain a second insurance policy which would also
provide coverage for the same damage. The ruling became
troublesome for both the judiciary and practitioners from its
inception.
C. Home v. Landmark (I and II)
The next major first-party case to discuss continuous loss
issues was Home Insurance Co. v. Landmark Insurance Co.
3 7
Home and Landmark were successive insurers of the Hotel Del
Coronado. Home was on the risk from September 1, 1980 to
October 1, 1981. Landmark insured the hotel for all relevant
periods following October 1, 1981.
Construction of the hotel was completed in February of
1973. In December of 1980, concrete on the exterior of the
building along with certain of the room balconies began to
manifest deterioration in the form of concrete chipping, crack-
ing or "spalling." After October 1, 1981, other room balconies
began to visibly manifest deterioration in the same manner.
The deterioration continued until December of 1983.38
The parties agreed the loss was caused by defects in the
design and construction of the concrete exterior of the build-
ing and concrete room balconies. Improper reinforcement
with steel, coupled with other chemical components of the
balconies, reacted with sea air and spray to cause damage. The
balconies continuously and progressively deteriorated from the
date of installation, sometime before 1973.' 9
The hotel filed first-party claims against both insurers. The
insurers settled in November of 1984 for $385,000. Home
contributed $285,000 and Landmark contributed $100,000.
Home then filed an action for declaratory relief, and Land-
mark cross-complained. The trial court awarded Landmark
37. 197 Cal. App. 3d 954, 243 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1988) (Home 1), reh'g granted,
205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1988) (Home 11). See infra notes
47-48, 52-55, 60-61 and accompanying text.
38. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1391, 253
Cal. Rptr. 277, 279 (1988) (Home II).
39. Id.
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$100,000, holding Home liable for all of the damages.4 °
Home appealed.
The court of appeal began its discussion by reviewing
Snapp.4' The Home court cited the following language with
approval:
Once the contingent event insured against has occurred
during the period covered, the liability of the carrier be-
comes contractual rather than potential only, and the sole
issue remaining is the extent of its obligation, and it is
immaterial that this may not be fully ascertained at the
end of the policy period.4"
The Home court also cited Remmer"3 for the proposition
that the time of the occurrence of an accident within an indem-
nity policy is not the time the wrongful act was committed, but
the time when the complaining party was damaged. The ques-
tion in Remmer then became whether a "manifestation" or
"exposure" rule was to be used to determine which policies
were at risk for the loss.44
Home argued the responsibility should be apportioned
between Home and Landmark based on an exposure theory
such as the one used in asbestos cases and relied on by the
California Union court. In essence, Home argued that indemni-
ty must be apportioned between both carriers based on the
amount of time each insurer was on the risk; i.e., based on
each insurer's "exposure." The Home court found the exposure
theory unpersuasive for two reasons.
First, the court pointed out that the asbestos cases such as
Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations45 were
distinguishable in that the judiciary viewed each deposit of scar
tissue as a separate occurrence of bodily injury in a continuing
tort.46 The court noted that "[c]ommon sense tells us that
40. Id. at 1392, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 279.
41. Id. at 1392-93, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
42. Id. at 1392-93, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 280 (quoting Snapp v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 832, 24 Cal. Rptr. 44, 46 (1962)) (emphasis
added).
43. Remmer v. Glens Falls Indemnity Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d 19
(1956).
44. See id. at 89, 295 P.2d at 22.
45. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
46. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1394-95,
253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 281 (1988) (Home II).
859
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property damage cases, even those involving continuous dam-
age such as the one before us, differ from asbestos cases where
injury is immediate, cumulative and exacerbated by repeated
exposure."
47
The court also pointed out that Home's arguments would
violate the loss-in-progress rule. Holding an insurer liable for
damage manifested in another insurer's policy period would be
contrary to the requirement that an insurance company insure
only against contingent and unknown risks. If the damage
manifested before the Landmark policy came on the risk, as a
matter of public policy, ensuing damages would be uninsur-
able. The Home court ruled that the cracking represented a
mere manifestation of the same, single occurrence and that the
cracking occurred during the earlier policy period. Therefore,
the later manifestations were not "contingent" or "unknown,"
but were to have been expected.
An issue alluded to, but not fully discussed by the court,
was whether the trial court had erred in inferring that the
spalling in 1980 was sufficient "to put a reasonable person on
notice of a possible defect in the structure."4" Home cited Unit-
ed States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. American Ins. Co.,49 for the "rea-
sonable person" test5" but refused to adopt this standard.5
The court granted rehearing to the Landmark litigants ten
months later in order to discuss the continuous loss issues
further.52 The court began this second discussion by noting
that "[t]hese facts do not allow us to consider the interesting
question whether it is possible for the insured to have a cov-
ered loss when the loss is not reasonably observable by the insured
during the period of the policy under which the insured seeks
payment.
55
47. Id. at 1395, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
48. Id. at 1396, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 282.
49. 169 Ind. App. 1, 345 N.E.2d 267 (1976).
50. Id. at 8, 345 N.E.2d at 272.
51. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1396, 253
Cal. Rptr. 277, 282 (1988) (Home 11). Predictably, this "interesting" issue regarding
the manifestation versus discovery doctrine was reached eight months later by the
same panel in the case of Prudentia-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 224
Cal. App. 3d 389, 260 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1989), reh'g granted, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 694-
700, 798 P.2d 1230, 1243-47, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 400-04 (1990).
52. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 253 Cal.
Rptr. 277 (1988) (Home II).
53. Id. at 1392, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 279-80 (emphasis added).
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The Home II court continued its discussion by citing nu-
merous cases (including California Union,54 Snapp,55 and
Harman56) for the proposition that, in property damage cases,
"manifestation" routinely refers to the period of time when the
damage first "becomes apparent." This point was not men-
tioned in the earlier decision. Because of the facts of the case,
the court would not consider whether the date of the manfestation
might differ from the date of discovery. In this case, the date of
manifestation and discovery was the same.
Relying on Snapp and Remmer, the Home II court held that
the date of manifestation determined which carrier must pro-
vide indemnity for a loss. 57 Since the time of the occurrence
of an accident, within the meaning of an indemnity policy, is
not the time the wrongful act was committed, but rather the
time when the complaining party was actually damaged, the
carrier on the risk at the time the damage occurred is responsi-
ble for the entire loss.5"
The court noted that one of the reasons for granting re-
hearing was to resolve the question of whether the rules appli-
cable to third-party cases are equally applicable to first-party
claims. The court held that there was "no meaningful differ-
ence," as the parties themselves had agreed.59 The Home II
court then went on to again hold: "[A]s between two first-party
insurers, one of which is on the risk on the date of the first
manifestation of property damage, and the other on the risk
after the date of the first manifestation of damage, the first
insurer must pay the entire claim."6"
The Home II court again attacked the rationale relied on
in California Union" and added a new point. The court ex-
pressed concern that the Calfornia Union court had "misap-
plied three pre-manifestation cases to hold a post-manifestation
carrier jointly and severally liable," referring to Keene,2
54. California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462,
193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
55. Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 44 (1962).
56. Harman v. American Casualty Co., 155 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Cal. 1957).
57. 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1392, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 280 (1988) (Home II).
58. Id. at 1393, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 280.
59. Id.
60. Id., 253 Cal. Rptr. at 281.
61. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
62. Keene. Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C.
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Forty-Eight Insulations,6" and Gruol.6 4 The Home II court reaf-
firmed their earlier decision by ruling that California Union was
not controlling.
The court next discussed the policy considerations behind
its decision. The court stated that its new holding would pro-
mote certainty in the insurance industry and would allow insur-
ers to gauge premiums with greater accuracy. This would, in
turn, reduce costs for consumers. This language later was quot-
ed with approval by the supreme court in Prudential-LMI.6 5
The court again refused to discuss in detail Home's argu-
ment that the trial court erred in inferring that spalling suffi-
cient to put a reasonable person on notice of a possible defec-
tive structure, had occurred in December 1980. The Home II
court concluded, as it had in its earlier decision, that the stipu-
lated statement of facts was intended by Home to include the
inference that the December 1980 deterioration was severe
enough to alert a reasonable person.66
D. The Appellate Court's Prudential-LMI And Fire Insurance
Exchange Decisions
The same appellate court that handed down the Home
If'7 decision again addressed the issue of continuing loss less
than one year later in Prudential-LMI Commercial Insurance v.
Superior Court.68 Prudential was one of three insurers on the
risk for the insureds' property. The insured residence had
been built in the early 1970's. In November of 1985, the
insureds discovered a crack in the foundation and slab floor.
They filed a claim with Prudential in December of 1985.69
The claim was denied. More than a year and a half later, the
Cir. 1981), cen. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
63. Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
64. Gruol v. Insurance Co. of North America, 11 Wash. App. 632, 524 P.2d
427 (1974).
65. Prudentia-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674,
698-99, 798 P.2d 1230, 1246, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387, 403 (1990).
66. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1396, 253
Cal. Rptr. 277, 283 (1988) (Home 11).
67. Id.
68. 224 Cal. App. 3d 389, 260 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1989), rehg granted, 51 Cal. 3d
674, 798 P.2d 1230, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990).
69. Id. at 394, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 86.
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insureds filed suit against Prudential and other insurers of the
residence.
70
Prudential's motion for summary judgment argued the
action was barred by the standard "one-year suit provision "71
in the policy. That provision provided that: "No suit or action
on this policy for the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable
in any court of law or equity unless all the requirements of this
policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced
within 12 months next after inception of the loss.
" 71
The insureds claimed they should not be required to com-
ply with the aforementioned provision because the claimed
loss could not have been reasonably discovered within the poli-
cy period. In other words, the inception of the loss had not yet
taken place. After the trial court denied summary judgment,
the court of appeal granted Prudential's petition for alternative
writ.7
3
The Prudential-LMI court stated it would limit its discus-
sion to the question of timeliness of the claim and suit, and
would not discuss whether or not the claim was covered under
the Prudential policy.74 The court quickly concluded that, al-
though the claim was made without "unnecessary delay" as
required by the policy, the lawsuit was not timely in that it was
not filed within one year of the inception of the loss. 75 How-
ever, the court held that such a determination did not render
the petition moot because the issues presented were of state-
wide importance and there was little consistency in the trial
courts in their rulings on these issues.76
The court expressed concern over a literal interpretation
of the policy which required the insureds to make their claim
"without unnecessary delay," and any action to be filed within
one year "after inception of the loss."77 The court determined
that a literal reading of such a clause would require insureds to
file a claim even in instances where they were ignorant of the
damage. The court held that on these facts, a "delayed discov-
70. Id. at 395, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
71. Id.
72. Id.; see also CAL. INS. CODE § 2071 (West 1972).
73. PAudential-LMI, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 396, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
74. Id. at 397, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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ery 'T rule must be applied to the policy clause. This standard
would be discussed in depth later by the California Supreme
Court.
The Prudential-LMI court then addressed the issue of the
timeliness of the insured's claims, discussing the point at which
the limitations period began to run. In support of its ruling,
the court cited Zurn Engineers v. Eagle Star Insurance Co.7" The
Zurn court held that if "the right to sue upon an insurance
policy is postponed by action that must be taken by the in-
sured as a prerequisite to suit, the limitation period does not
commence to run until the insured has an opportunity to com-
ply with the conditions precedent to litigation."80 The
Prudential-LMI court also noted that, although the language in
Zurn was very broad, the court in that case limited its ruling to
the facts in the case.
The Prudential-LMI court concluded that the type of pro-
gressive property loss alleged in the instant case was different
from the usual type of damage for which a first-party policy
was designed. Accordingly, the reasons for strictly enforcing
notice of loss and one-year suit provisions were not "squarely"
applicable.8 ' Thus, the date at which "appreciable" damage is
detected initiates the running of the contractual limitations
period. 2 Otherwise, the merits of such coverage disputes
could never be litigated.
This certainly makes sense in the ordinary situation where
a distinct and specific injury has occurred, but has lain dor-
mant. However, such a rule may be questioned in cases such as
Prudential-LMI, where there is a continuing and steady deterio-
ration of the property. Equating the time the injury is suffered
with the time the injury is discovered enables courts to readily
assign liability under the policies, but such assignments may
not necessarily be equitable. An example of this inequity would
be where carrier A is on risk for the first ten years of a
structure's existence, at which time carrier B commences cov-
78. Id., 260 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
79. 61 Cal. App. 3d 493, 132 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1976).
80. Id. at 499, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 210, quoted in Prudentia-LMI Commercial
Ins. v. Superior Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d 389, 402-03, 260 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92
(1989).
81. Prudential-LMI, 224 Cal. App. 3d at 408, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
82. Id.
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erage. If subsidence begins in year five, but discovery occurs in
year eleven, under the above rule carrier B would be liable for
all six years of damage, despite only being on the risk for one
year. The California Supreme Court later approved this inequi-
ty when it considered Prudential-LMI.83
On the day the appellate court decided Prudential-LMI, it
also filed Fire Insurance Exchange v. Superior Court.4 In the
Fire Insurance Exchange case (later depublished by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court), the insured discovered her home had
been damaged in December of 1984, when she noticed the
rafters in her attic had become separated from the
bridgeboard. In February and May of 1985, she discovered
cracks in the slab, floor, wall, and ceiling of the house. Never-
theless, the insured failed to file a claim until January of 1986.
After Fire Insurance Exchange (FIE) denied the claim, the in-
sured filed a bad faith action. As in Prudential-LMI, the insurer
sought summary judgment.8 5
Relying on its holding in Prudential-LMI, the court stated
that the issue at bar was when, under a reasonable person stan-
dard, the "inception of the loss" took place.86 The court stat-
ed that:
Applying a reasonableness standard to these facts, we con-
clude the December 1984 damage was unusual and severe
enough to start a contractual limitations period running.
[The insured's] observation of this language gave her the
specialized knowledge she needed to place her under a
duty to investigate her rights under the policy. These ob-
jective facts, not her receipt ... of the Fireman's Fund
rejection ... control the application of the limitations
period. s7
E. Recent One-Year Suit Provision Cases
Several recent court of appeal opinions have discussed the
distinct, yet related issues surrounding the so called one-year
suit provision. In order to provide a complete understanding
83. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 798
P.2d 1230, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990).
84. 212 Cal. App. 3d 39, 260 Cal. Rptr. 299 (1989).
85. Id., 260 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
86. Id. at 43, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
87. Id.
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of the policies behind the supreme court's Prudential-LMI, the
following analysis is provided.
In Magnolia Square Homeowners Association v. Safeco Insur-
ance Co. of America, 8 Safeco brought a declaratory relief ac-
tion against the Magnolia Square Homeowners Association
(the HOA) seeking a judicial declaration that it had no duty to
indemnify the HOA for first-party losses in its condominium
complex. The court of appeal held that the trial court properly
granted summary judgment for the insurer on the basis of the
one-year limitations provision. Taking judicial notice of a com-
plaint filed in a separate action by the HOA against the devel-
oper, the court found that the HOA had notice of the claimed
defects at the time of filing that complaint and, thus, affirmed
summary judgment. Even under an application of the rule that
a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers, or
should have discovered, all facts essential to the cause of ac-
tion, the court held the action was barred because the HOA
could have discovered both the damage and its cause through
the exercise of reasonable diligence by the time the complaint
in the other action was filed.8 9
In Love v. Fire Insurance Exchange,9° the insureds noticed
cracks in the foundation of their building and other related
settlement problems. They then hired a geotechnical engineer-
ing firm to inspect their home. The firm advised them that the
damage was related to earth movement and the negligence of
the home's builders.9'
The insureds filed a claim for these damages which was
rejected by Fire Insurance Exchange. Almost five years later,
the insureds resubmitted their claim. Fire Insurance Exchange
again denied coverage. The insureds filed suit for breach of
contract and the trial court granted Fire Insurance Exchange's
motion for summary judgment.92
The Love court held the insureds' suit on the policy was
time barred due to the fact that the geotechnical firm had noti-
fied them that their home was suffering from subsidence prob-
lems, caused by third-party negligence, almost seven years be-
88. 221 Cal. App. 3d 1049, 271 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1990).
89. Id. at 1059-60, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
90. 221 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 271 Cal. Rptr. 246 (1990).
91. Id. at 1141, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
92. Id. at 1142, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
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fore the suit was initiated. Citing Lawrence v. Western Mutual
Insurance Co.,94 the court held that the one-year statute of lim-
itations began running when the insureds knew, or should
have known, the facts essential to their claim, not the legal basis there-
for. 
95
In Stanley v. Fire Insurance Exchange9 6 the court ruled that
the one-year "suit on the policy" provision would be equitably
tolled from the time the insured gave notice of the loss until
the insurer formally acted upon that notice. 7 Aside from dis-
cussing the one-year provision, the Stanley court also ruled
that, in a first-party case, a policy which provides coverage for
damages "which happen during the policy term" provides cover-
age for losses which in fact take place during the policy period,
but which do not manifest themselves until some time after
the policy is cancelled. Based on a strict construction of the in-
surance policy, the Stanley court held that even though the
damages to the insured's residence did not become apparent
until 1985, the Fire Insurance Exchange policies in force be-
tween 1977 and 1982 provided coverage for the loss since the
damages did, in fact, "happen" during that period of time.98
The aforementioned decisions demonstrate that at least
two distinct factors arise when analyzing a first-party contin-
uous loss claim. Because of the loss-in-progress rule, the court
must fix a date when the loss is no longer "contingent" and
thereby determine which in a series of successive policies is the
"last" policy on the risk. Second, because of the one-year suit
on the policy provision, the court is required to determine
"the inception of the loss" so as to establish when the one-year
limitation period begins to run. These two factors inherently
affect one another.99
93. Id. at 1143-44, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 249-50.
94. 204 Cal. App. 3d 565, 251 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1988).
95. Love, 221 Cal. App. 3d at 1143, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
96. 224 Cal. App. 3d 833, 274 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1990).
97. Id. at 841, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
98. Id. at 840, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
99. This relationship will be considered following discussion of the California
Supreme Court's PudentialLMI decision, infra notes 149-54 and accompanying
text.
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F. Recent Third-Party Continuous Loss Decisions
Three recent court of appeal decisions impact continuous
property loss theories in the third-party context. In Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,' °° the
Fourth District again considered the issue of continuing loss,
this time in the third-party context. Fireman's Fund insured a
contractor, Nielsen, until October 1, 1985, after which Aetna
was on the risk. Nielsen was hired by the U.S. Grant Hotel to
perform structural repairs to the hotel in January 1984. Niel-
sen subcontracted with J.L. Studios to restore the exterior
facade. J.L. applied a patching compound to the exterior sur-
face, finishing its work in October 1984.
In June 1985, the hotel notified Nielsen that the facade
was cracking and spalling. In August 1985, Nielsen was notified
of deteriorating plaster. In April 1986, Neilsen learned that the
patching compound used was suitable only for horizontal, not
vertical, surfaces. Because J.L. had applied the compound to
the vertical surface, it was likely that material would continue
to deteriorate.'0 '
In August 1987, the hotel recovered a $354,192.91 arbitra-
tion award against Neilsen, which Fireman's Fund satisfied. In
February 1988, Fireman's Fund brought suit against Aetna for
equitable subrogation, contribution, and declaratory relief. The
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment based upon
stipulated facts. The trial court entered judgment in favor of
Aetna and the court of appeal affirmed.'1 2
On appeal, Fireman's Fund argued that California Union v.
Landmark Insurance'0 3 was controlling. In addition, Fireman's
Fund argued that Home Insurance was inapplicable, because
that case involved a first-party claim. The Aetna court held Cali-
fornia Union inapplicable, noting:
The short answer to Fireman's Fund first contention is in
Home this court considered and rejected California Union
Insurance Co. v. Landmark Insurance Co .... Fireman's
Fund offers no compelling reason why we should reexam-
100. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1621, 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1990).
101. Id. at 1624, 273 Cal. Rptr. 432.
102. Id. at 1625, 273 Cal. Rptr. 432.
103. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
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ine our previous refusal to follow California Union and the
asbestos cases it relies upon in this property damage
case. 104
The Aetna court then held that Home Insurance was appli-
cable, despite the express limitations in its holding. The court
noted "distinguishing facts should not lead to a different result
unless such facts have legal significance."
10 5
The Home II decision relied on the "loss-in-progress
rule."1"6 The Fireman's Fund court noted: "Thus, to the ex-
tent Home's rationale rests on the loss-in-progress rule, it, too,
is fully applicable to a third-party claim."' °7 The court then dis-
cussed what limitations did exist with respect to the Home II
holding:
[T]he critical limiting fact in Home is it is a case where the
claimant has apparently been fully satisfied by insurance
proceeds and the case involves allocating the loss between
insurers. That fact is the critical one because it permitted
the court to adopt a rule based more upon public policy
considerations; there was no need to focus on the insur-
ance policy language interpreted in light of the insured's
reasonable expectation of coverage.' °
The court pointed out that the facts at bar were similar in
that the insured's loss had been fully satisfied, and the instant
action was solely between insurers seeking to allocate the loss.
Thus, the court turned to the language of the policies, viewed
through the eyes of the insurance industry. °9
The court quoted from an "insurance industry commenta-
tor":
[I]t is intended that only one policy should apply to the
physical injury to tangible property... and that is the
policy in effect at the time the physical injury occurs. No
matter how long thereafter the loss of use may extend,
104. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d
at 1626, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
105. Id.
106. 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1988) (Home II). See CAL.
INS. CODE §§ 22, 250 (West 1972).
107. Fimman's Fund, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 1627, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
108. Id. at 1627-28, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
109. "[W]here two insurers dispute the meaning of identical standard form
policy language-the meaning attached to the provisions by the insurance industry
is, at minimum, relevant." Id. at 1629, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
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only that one policy is meant to apply, and then only to
the extent of the 'each occurrence' limit .... The intent is
to relate coverage to only the one policy period in which
the onset of the condition happened."'
Based on such considerations, the court rejected
Fireman's assertion that the Aetna policy provided coverage
and also rejected Fireman's contention that a "delayed discov-
ery" rule should be applied, which would have established
manifestation as occurring within the Aetna policy coverage
period. The court briefly discussed the policy reasons behind
the rule, and noted that "[t]hese policies ... are not effectuat-
ed by applying the delayed discovery rule in this context."' 1'
Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed for Aetna.
The Fireman's Fund decision finally raised a split of author-
ity as to whether a liability carrier coming on the risk after the
damage is manifest can be liable for the continuing losses
thereof. In direct opposition to the holding in California Un-
ion,112 the Fireman's Fund decision applied the
"loss-in-progress" rule to third-party cases and held that an in-
surer whose policy is in effect when the damage is first discov-
ered, or becomes manifest, is liable for that loss and that subse-
quent insurers are not."' This ruling is consistent with the
plain language of Insurance Code sections 22 and 250, which
specifically state that they apply to insurance coverage for "lia-
bility" as well as "losses."
The second recent decision dealing with third-party con-
tinuous loss issues is Chu v. Canadian Indemnity Co."' In
conjunction with the third recent third-party decision, Garriott
Crop Dusting Co. v. Superior Court,"5 the scope of liability in-
surance coverage has been dramatically expanded.
In Chu, the insured developer sought insurance coverage
for liability arising out of the sale of defectively constructed
condominiums."' The developer stipulated that he knew of
110. Id. (quoting Tinker, Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Perspective and
Overview, 25 FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q. 217, 24142 (1975)).
111. Id. at 1630, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
112. 145 Cal. App. 3d 462, 193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
113. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d
at 1629, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 435 (1990).
114. 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1990).
115. 221 Cal. App. 3d 783, 270 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1990).
116. 224 Cal. App. 3d 86, 274 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1990).
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certain construction defects prior to the issuance of the policy,
and conceded that the insurer was not responsible for those
problems. Nevertheless, the developer sought coverage for
defects that first manifested themselves after the policy was
issued. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
insurer, reasoning that the second type of specified damages
was merely a continuation of the damage which had manifest-
ed before the policy was issued. The court of appeal disagreed
and reversed.
The court of appeal ruled that the developer would be
entitled to coverage for any construction defects he negligently
failed to discover before the policy was issued. The court ruled
that knowledge of one defect is not the equivalent of a
knowledge of another and, therefore, held that the finder of
fact must analyze each defect separately to determine the
developer's knowledge of that defect when he sold the condo-
miniums. If the defect did not manifest itself before the policy
was issued, the insurer must provide coverage." 7 The court
also ruled that the developer was entitled to coverage unless
he "actually knew of the defect," and that even if the developer
should have discovered the defect the loss-in-progress rule
would not bar coverage.' 18
In Garriott, the insured was sued for toxic contamination
of adjacent property caused by the dumping of crop dusting
chemicals over an extended period of time." 9 During the
time the contamination was taking place, the insured was cov-
ered under several successive liability insurance policies.
The insurer on the risk at the time the underlying
third-party action was filed brought a separate action for de-
claratory relief. The insurer, whose policy covered the
insured's property during the time the contamination was
alleged to have first begun, moved for summary judgment.
This motion was based upon the grounds that the owner of
the adjacent property had suffered no damage during the first
insurer's policy period since it did not purchase the adjacent
land until several years after that policy expired. The trial
court granted the motion but the court of appeal reversed.
117. Id. at 99, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 28.
118. Id.
119. Garriott Crop Dusting Co. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d 783, 270
Cal. Rptr. 678 (1990).
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The court began its analysis by recognizing that "[t]he
proper initial focus for a court in resolving a question of insur-
ance coverage is on the language of the insurance policy itself,
rather than on judicially created 'general' rules that are not
necessarily responsive to the policy language or facts of the dis-
pute. " 12 The policies promised to provide third-party cover-
age for property damage caused by an "occurrence." The word
"occurrence" was defined as "physical injury to or destruction
of tangible property ... during the policy period."121 The court
concluded:
[U]nder the terms of the insurance policies .. the event
triggering coverage is one that causes "physical injury to or
destruction of tangible property" during the policy period.
Nowhere do the policies say to whom that property must
belong, save that it must- not belong to the insured. In
other words, the policies themselves do not expressly re-
quire that the eventual claimant own the property at the
time the property is damaged for coverage to ensue; they
merely require that the damage, the "physical injury to ...
tangible property," take place during the policy period.
The question raised by the policy language is not when the
[claimant] was damaged; it is, instead, when the property
now owned by the [claimant] was damaged. 2'
Focusing on the language of the policies themselves, the
Garriott court filled the one remaining "gap" in the analysis of
third-party continuous property loss cases. If viewed on a
timeline, there are three "types" of insurers in third-party con-
tinuous loss cases: insurers on the risk while the damage is in
fact taking place but which has not yet become manifest; insur-
ers on the risk when the damage manifests itself; and insurers
on the risk after the damage is manifest. Issues involving the
second and third types of third-party insurers were discussed
in the California Union 2 ' and Fireman's Fund v. Aetna'24 deci-
sions (ending in a split of authority). While the Garriott125 de-
120. Id. at 790, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (citing Harbor Ins. Co. v. Central Nat'l
Ins. Co., 165 Cal. App. 3d 1029, 1034-35, 211 Cal. Rptr. 902, 906 (1985)).
121. Id. at 783, 791, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (1990) (emphasis added).
122. Id.
123. California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462,
193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
124. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1621, 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1990).
125. Garriott Crop Dusting Co. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d 86, 274
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cision is unique in that the claimant did not own the property
when the damage took place, the decision can be relied upon
for the proposition that pre-manifestation insurers are liable
for damage which occurs during their policy period.
IV. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT'S
PRUDENTIAL-LMI DECISION
On November 1, 1990, the California Supreme Court
settled most of the uncertainties in the first-party continuous
loss arena when it rendered its decision in Prudential-LMI Com-
mercial Insurance v. Superior Court.'26 As previously discussed,
the Prudential-LMI decision involved a first-party claim filed by
homeowners against their insurer, Prudential, following the
discovery of a crack in their foundation underneath a floor
covering. The claim was filed in December 1985 and was de-
nied by Prudential following an investigation which revealed
that the cause of the damage was expansive soil. The home-
owners filed suit in August 1987, prior to receiving notice of
the denial of coverage.
Prudential moved for summary judgment, arguing there
was no damage or evidence of cracking during its policy cover-
age period and that the suit was time barred since it was filed
twenty months after the insureds filed their claim. Prudential's
motion was denied and the company appealed.
The court of appeal directed the trial court to vacate its
order denying the insurer's summary judgement motion and
to enter another order granting the relief requested." 7 Both
parties petitioned the California Supreme Court for review,
both petitions were granted.
The supreme court decision 128 consisted of three basic
holdings. First, the one-year suit provision begins to run on the
date of inception of the loss, defined as that point in time
when appreciable damage occurs and is, or should be, known
to the insured, such that a reasonable insured would be aware
that his notification duty under the policy has been trig-
Cal. Rptr. 678 (1990).
126. 51 Cal. 3d 674, 798 P.2d 1230, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990).
127. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d
1155, 260 Cal. Rptr. 99 (1989).
128. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 798
P.2d 1230, 274 Cal. Rptr. 387 (1990).
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gered.1 ' Second, the limitation period is equitably tolled
from the time the insured files a timely notice, pursuant to
policy notice provisions, to the time the insurer formally de-
nies the claim.' Third, in a first-party property damage
case, the carrier insuring the property at the time of manifesta-
tion of property damage is solely responsible for indemnifica-
tion once coverage is found to exist."'1 Of these three hold-
ings, the third, and to a limited extent the first, are vitally im-
portant to the continuous loss issue.
The supreme court discussed the historical development
of the one-year suit provision as set forth in Insurance Code
section 2071, and again concluded that the statutory limitation
was permissible. However, the court also held that the "incep-
tion of the loss" should not be equated with the occurrence of
the physical event causing the loss, as this would put an undue
burden upon the insured.12 If the one-year period began to
run at the occurrence of the physical event of the damage, in
order to avoid the one-year provision the insured would be
required, in essence, to file suit on a yearly basis.
Additionally, the court cited Zurn Engineers v. Eagle Star
Insurance Co.' for the proposition that "if the right to sue
upon an insurance policy is postponed by action that must be
taken by the insured as a prerequisite to the suit, the limitation
period does not commence to run until the insured has an
opportunity to comply with the conditions precedent to litiga-
tion. " 3
4
The court also commented on two first-party cases which
held that a delayed discovery rule was appropriate to require
an insured responsible for initiating a claim based on the date
on which the insured could reasonably have concluded his
property suffered a loss.' Finally, the court held that incep-
129. Id. at 687, 798 P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
130. Id. at 693, 798 P.2d at 1242, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
131. Id. at 699, 798 P.2d at 1246-47, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 403-04.
132. Id.
133. 61 Cal. App. 3d 493, 132 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1976).
134. Prudentia-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d at 685, 798
P.2d at 1237, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
135. Id. at 685-86, 798 P.2d 1237-38, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 394-95. The two cases
discussed were Lawrence v. Western Mut. Ins. Co., 204 Cal. App. 3d. 565, 251
Cal. Rptr. 319 (1988); Abari v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d.
530, 252 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1988).
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tion of the loss would be determined by reference to reason-
able discovery of the loss and would not necessarily turn on
the occurrence of the physical event causing the loss.136 The
court limited this by holding that the insured is required to be
diligent in the face of discovered facts in order to take advan-
tage of the delayed discovery rule.3 7 Determining when ap-
preciable damage has occurred, such that a reasonable insured
would be on notice of a potentially insured loss, is a question
for the trier of fact.
The court phrased the third issue very carefully: "We next
examine allocation of indemnity between successive first-party
property insurers when the loss is continuous and progressive
throughout successive policy periods, but is not discovered un-
til it becomes appreciable, for a reasonable insured to be
aware that his notification duty under the policy has been
triggered."' 8
The court of appeal had observed, in dictum, that appor-
tionment of damages between all insurers who insured the risk
during the time of the development of the injury would be
equitable. In doing so, the court had relied upon a line of cas-
es applying the continuous exposure theory of loss allocation.
The supreme court traced the development of this theory,
citing the Gruol v. Insurance Co. of North America, 13 Insurance
Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations,4 ° and Keene
Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America cases, 14 1 relied on by
the court in California Union. Prudential asked the court to
adopt a "manifestation rule" of property damage, which would
fix liability for first-party losses solely on the insurer whose
policy was in force at the time the progressive damage mani-
fested.
136. Prudentia-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d at 686, 798
P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
137. Id. at 687, 798 P.2d at 1238, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
138. Id. at 693, 798 P.2d at 1242, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
139. 11 Wash. App. 632, 524 P.2d 427 (1974).
140. 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir. 1980).
141. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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The court adopted the rule requested by Prudential, citing
Home,142 Snapp143 and Sabella'14 with approval. The court
noted the manifestation rule in the first-party context:
[P]romotes certainty in the insurance industry and allows
insurers to gauge premiums with greater accuracy. Presum-
ably this should reduce costs for consumers because insur-
ers will be able to set aside proper reserves for
well-defined coverages and avoid increasing such reserves
to cover potential financial losses caused by uncertainty in
the definition of coverage. 45
The court, therefore, held that "in first-party progressive
loss cases, when, as in the present case, the loss occurs over
several policy periods and is not discovered until several years
after it commences, the manifestation rule applies." 146
The court also held the time of manifestation was the
same as inception of the loss; i.e., "that point in time when ap-
preciable damage occurs and is or should be known to the
insured, such that a reasonable insured would be aware that
his notification duty under the policy has been triggered.' ' 47
In addition to the court's stated rationale for its ruling,
the decision also meets other relevant policy concerns. From a
practical standpoint, by establishing a fixed point in time as
the trigger of both coverage and the running of the one-year
provision, the court prevented the one year provision from
running before the insured could reasonably discover the loss.
This prevents the insured from being required to file yearly
lawsuits to protect his or her rights under the one-year provi-
sion.
However, the supreme court expressly refused to define
the rules for third-party cases. The Prudential-LMI court repeat-
edly stated:
142. Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 197 Cal. App. 3d 954, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 202 (1988) (Home I), eh'g gvanted, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 253 Cal. Rptr.
277 (1988) (Home II).
143. Snapp v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 206 Cal. App. 2d 827, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 44 (1962).
144. Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal. 2d 21, 377 P.2d 889, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1963).
145. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d at 699, 798
P.2d at 1246, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 403 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins.
Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388, 1395-96, 253 Cal. Rptr 277, 282 (1988) (Home II)).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 699, 798 P.2d at 1247, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
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As we recognized in Gaivey v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., there are substantial analytical differences between
first-party property policies and third-party liability policies.
Accordingly, we intimate no view as to the application of
our decision in either the third-party liability or commer-
cial liability (including toxic tort) context.'48
V. THIRD-PARTY CONTINUOUS Loss ANALYSIS
In light of the California Supreme Court's action (or inac-
tion), there is presently no clear-cut rule for third-party liability
cases. What should the rule be?
As set forth above, there are three areas, or types, of in-
surers in the third-party arena. There are insurers on the risk
before the damage is manifest, insurers on the risk when the
damage manifests, and insurers on the risk after the damage
manifests.
First, the court should agree with the Aetna holding that
post-manifestation carriers are not liable for the loss, even
though the damage did occur during their policy periods. Such
a ruling would be in harmony with the loss-in-progress rule
and would promote all of the same policy considerations that
exist in first-party cases.
The governing statutes themselves, Insurance Code sec-
tions 22 and 250, apply to both first- and third-party claims.
The code sections not only refer to policies which provide
coverage for "damage" or "losses," but also refer to policies
which provide coverage for "liability." It should be noted that
neither statute restricts the applicability of the loss-in-progress
rule to events which are contingentfrom the standpoint of the in-
sured. Rather, both statutes merely preclude coverage for
non-contingent liabilities. The question then becomes whether
or not the loss-in-progress rule should be applied, in
third-party cases, when the insured has notice of the loss or
when the loss first becomes manifest to the third-party claimant.
For example, an insured might dump toxic chemicals on
his property during year one. During year two, his adjoining
landowners' property might be damaged by diffusion of toxic
chemicals from the insured's land into the claimant's land. The
148. Id. at 679, 798 P.2d at 1232, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 389 (citations omitted).
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claimant might then discover the pollution during year three,
yet fail to notify the insured until year five. If the insured was
issued a policy by Company A during years one, two and three
(the years when the dumping took place, the damage actually
occurred, and when the damage became manifest to the claim-
ant), and obtained a new policy from Company B during years
four and five (the years when the damage had manifested to
the claimant and during which the insured first became aware
of the damage), the question would then become whether the
loss-in-progress rule would preclude coverage under the policy
issued by Company B.
The insured might argue that the loss-in-progress rule is
inapplicable since he or she was not aware of the loss when he
or she first applied for the policy and therefore, from the
standpoint of the insured, the liability was "contingent or un-
known." While persuasive at first blush, this argument is none-
theless flawed.
In the first-party context, the focus of the loss-in-progress
rule is on the imnured's knowledge of facts that would cause a
reasonable insured to be aware that his notification duty under
the policy has been triggered. It follows that since a first-party
loss is incurred, by definition, by the insured himself or her-
self, the insured's knowledge should be the touchstone for
application of the loss-in-progress rule. This same consider-
ation may well require a directly opposite result in the
third-party context.
In the third-party context, the claimant is in exclusive
control of the property that is allegedly damaged. In fact,
many insureds may visit subsequently damaged property only
once-as in the case of a contractor performing certain work at
ajob site. A contractor might work on the claimant's property
for a brief period of time, performing negligent acts that sub-
sequently result in damage, and never return.
If the third-party claimant's knowledge is not made the
touchstone for application of the loss-in-progress rule in the
third-party context, it would discourage an injured claimant
from notifying the insured of the damage and thereby exacer-
bate the cost of indemnity under the policy. For example, if a
claimant notices patent construction defects in year one, the
claimant could delay notifying the insured until the four-year
statute of limitations had almost expired in order to provide
three additional years of liability coverage for settlement of the
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suit. Such a rule, therefore, would have the practical effect of
contradicting the policy of promoting certainty in the insur-
ance industry and reducing costs of insurance for consum-
ers. 1
49
The proper analysis is found at footnote 5 of the Fireman's
Fund Insurance Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. decision. 50
There, the court stated that "[i]n the context of a liability poli-
cy, it is the damage which must be 'contingent or unknown,'
and not the liability of the insured or cause of the dam-
age."
15 1
Thus, in the example set forth above, only Company A is
at risk for the loss since the claimant's damage was not con-
tingent when policy B was purchased. The carrier on the risk
when the damage is manifest to a reasonable claimant should
be liable. The manifestation period should be defined as the
point in time when appreciable damage occurs and is, or
should be, known to the claimant, such that a reasonable
claimant would be aware that he or she had suffered a loss.
Since it is clear that all carriers on the risk when the damage
first becomes manifest will be liable for the loss, the final ques-
tion to be resolved is whether pre-manifestation carriers should
also be on the risk.
The standard liability policy provides coverage for "prop-
erty damage" which takes place "during the policy period."
The phrase "property damage" is typically defined as "physical
injury to or destruction of tangible property." One approach
would be to argue that since the policy provides coverage for
physical injury to, or destruction of, tangible property which in
fact occurs during the life of the policy, there is no legal re-
quirement that the damage be manifest for it to have "oc-
curred." Stated another way, "actual occurrence of damage"
and "manifestation of damage" may be different phenomena.
Garriott suggests that there is no requirement that the damage
be manifest for it to have "occurred."'52 If that approach is
149. See Home Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1388,
1395-96, 253 Cal. Rptr. 277, 282 (1988) (Home II).
150. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 223 Cal. App. 3d
1621, 1627 n.5, 273 Cal. Rptr. 431, 434 n.5 (1990).
151. Id.
152. Garriott Crop Dusting Co. v. Superior Court, 221 Cal. App. 3d 783, 270
Cal. Rptr. 678 (1990). See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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adopted, pre-manifestation carriers may be responsible for
damages which in fact occur while their policies are in effect.
There is a significant difference between first- and
third-party coverages for purposes of continuous loss analysis.
First-party policies are subject to a one year limitation provi-
sion while third-party policies are not. As explained above, in
the first-party scenario, the supreme court limited the number
of insurers at risk in order to prevent the insured from being
forced to file yearly lawsuits in order to prevent them from
being time barred. Put another way, if the one-year-limitation
provision began to run when the damage actually occurred
(pre-manifestation), then in order to avoid having the suit
barred by the statute of limitations, the insured would be re-
quired to file a lawsuit before the expiration of the year follow-
ing each successive policy. Since this problem is not present in
the third-party context, there is no reason to apply the
first-party rule in the third-party context.
In American Star Insurance Co. v. American Employer's Insur-
ance Co., 153 the insured installed defective pipe during the
first of five successive liability policy periods. The damage be-
came manifest during policy year three and the damage was re-
paired after year five. The court of appeal held that both pre-
and post-manifestation carriers were required to share in the
loss, pro rata. In the post-manifestation analysis, the American
Star court followed the rule of the California Union 154 deci-
sion.
It should be noted that the California Supreme Court
ordered the expansive coverage decision of American Star
depublished. Although it is risky to assign motives to the su-
preme court when it depublishes decisions, such depublication
could indicate disapproval of such an expansive coverage ap-
proach which results in dragging in pre-manifestation insurers.
VI. CONCLUSION
After the California Supreme Court decision in
Prudential-LMI,155 questions involving "trigger of coverage" in
153. 165 Cal. App. 3d 728 (1985), depublished by order of the Supreme Court
dated May 16, 1985.
154. California Union Ins. Co. v. Landmark Ins. Co., 145 Cal. App. 3d 462,
193 Cal. Rptr. 461 (1983).
155. Prudential-LMI Commercial Ins. v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 798
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first-party cases have been substantially resolved: only the in-
surer on the risk when the insured knows, or should know,
that he has been appreciably damaged will be liable for the
loss. Stated another way, only the insurer on the risk at the
time of "manifestation" will provide coverage;
pre-manifestation and post-manifestation carriers will not pro-
vide coverage in the first-party context.
The proper analysis for third-party cases, however, is still
muddled. Cases such as Fireman's Fund v. Aetna156 suggest
that first-party rules should equally apply in third-party cases.
One advantage of such an approach is that manifestation tends
to be a bright-line test, and this would create more certainty
with respect to insurance coverage, although at the same time
such a rule would generally result in less protection for the
insured from third-party liability claims.
As set forth above, a pro-coverage argument is that both
the carrier on the risk when manifestation occurs and the
pre-manifestation carrier on the risk when damages in fact
occur should provide insurance protection in the third-party
liability case.
The disadvantage of this approach is that it removes the
certainty that a manifestation test provides-a test which is
finally bringing clarity to this muddled area of the law. In the
absence of manifestation-a phenomenon which the claimant
can see or should be able to see-old problems will continue to
exist, namely, when does damage actually occur? This can be a
fuzzy concept, involving a battle between geological and soils
experts.
The California Supreme Court has studiously avoided
stating what the rule should be in third-party liability cases.
However, this is an issue which is of vital importance to liti-
gants throughout the state. Therefore, it is expected that, if
presented with the proper third-party case, the supreme court
will finally clarify the coverage rules for continuous property
damage cases in this heavily-litigated area.
P.2d 1230, 274 Cal. Rpir. 387 (1990).
156. 223 Cal. App. 3d 1621, 273 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1990).

